

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ARA-16 EUR-25 EA-11 NEA-14 IO-14 ISO-00 AF-10

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04

NSAE-00 NSC-07 OIC-04 SP-03 PA-04 PRS-01 RSC-01

SCI-06 SS-20 USIA-15 SAJ-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /201 W

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FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4716

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 6175

DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA

SUBJECT: IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL VIEWS THE NPT

1. A GLOOMY DIRECTOR GENERAL EKLUND TALKED TO ME JULY 9
ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE NPT. EKLUND HAD JUST RETURNED

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FROM A WEEK IN GENEVA WHICH HAD INCLUDED CONSULTATIONS

WITH MANY CCD REPS. EKLUND REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH ME AFTER THE MAY 18 INDIAN TEST. (IAEA VIENNA 5114). HIS PREDICTIONS WERE, HE REGRETTED, COMING TO PASS SOONER THAN HE THOUGHT POSSIBLE. THE NPT WAS BEGINNING TO FALL TO PIECES.

2. EKLUND REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO ASSURE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. HE EXPRESSED GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE LEADERSHIP AND PERSEVERANCE OF THE USG IN THE LAST TWO DECADES OF EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM AND BUILD UP AN EFFECTIVE CONTROL SYSTEM - FIRST, THE EISENHOWER INITIATIVE AND CREATION OF THE IAEA WITH ITS FAR-SIGHTED STATUTE PROVISIONS ON INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. SECOND, THE GRADUAL CONVERSION OF THE SOVIETS TO SUPPORT OF A NPT STRUCTURE AND OF A DOCTRINAL BELIEF IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFEGUARDS ADMINISTERED BY THE IAEA. THIRD, THE CREATION AND REFINEMENT OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM AND THE ATTEMPTS TO HAVE IT APPLIED UNIVERSALLY IN ALL NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. THE US HAD AT ALL TIMES BEEN THE LEADER; HAD SET THE OBJECTIVES; PATIENTLY WORKED TOWARD THEM; AND HAD FOUND ITSELF IN THE SPRING OF 1974 IN SIGHT OF THE GOAL.

3. THIS STEADY PROGRESS TOWARDS CONTAINING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WAS SUDDENLY SIDETRACKED ON MAY 18 BY THE INDIAN EXPLOSION. EVEN THAT MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN A FATAL BLOW IF PROPERLY CONTAINED, AND IF OTHER STATES HAD CONTINUED TO RATIFY THE TREATY. IT HAD RAISED SERIOUS DOUBTS ON THE PART OF STATES NOT PARTY TO THE NPT AS TO WHETHER THEY SHOULD PROCEED WITH RATIFICATION, BUT MANY HAD BEEN STILL READY TO DO SO, IF SHOWN THAT THERE WERE GOOD REASONS. BUT THEIR DOUBTS WERE CONFIRMED BY THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR REACTOR SALES TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL. WITHOUT EITHER A CORRESPONDING REQUIREMENT, OR INDICATIONS OF A WILLINGNESS, THAT BOTH STATES ADHERE TO THE NPT. THIS RAISED THE SIMPLE QUESTION "IF ONE CAN HAVE FULL ACCESS TO ATOMIC FUEL, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT RATIFYING THE TREATY, WHY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD ANY STATE RATIFY?" THE IMPACT IN JAPAN WAS ALREADY BECOMING OBVIOUS AND THE ANTI-NPT POSITION OF SUCH CONFIDENTIAL

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COUNTRIES AS BRAZIL, ARGENTINA AND ISREAL HAD BEEN VALIDATED, IN THEIR OWN MIDS AT LEAST.

4. EKLUND SAID HE REALIZED THAT THE TIMING OF THE US NUCLEAR OFFERS TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL WAS BASED ON IMPORTANT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WE DISCUSSED AT LENGTH. HE WAS NOT FAULTING OUR ME POLICY, OR OUR INTENTIONS. HE ALSO REALIZED THAT THE SAFEGUARDS REGIME WHICH WOULD

APPLY ON NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR ITS PURPOSES OF ASSURING PEACEFUL USES. THIS WAS NOT HIS CONCERN. THE PROBLEM WAS SIMPLY THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WOULD ULTIMATELY BE DESTROYED UNLESS ISRAEL AND EGYPT BECAME PARTIES. THE WORLD HAD TO REALIZE THAT JOINING THE NPT WAS PART OF THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. PRIOR TO THE INDIAN EXPLOSION, IT SUFFICED TO HAVE THE KIND OF NON-NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS WHICH WERE CONTEMPLATED IN THE ISRAEL-EGYPT REACTOR SALES. THIS ALLOWED THE US TO SATISFY ITSELF THAT ANY NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE EXPORTED WOULD NOT BE DIVERTED TO USE IN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. NOW, HOWEVER, THIS LIMITED OBJECTIVE DID NOT IN HIS VIEW SUFFICE. IF ISRAEL AND EGYPT COULD MOVE INTO THE NUCLEAR FIELD WITH ASSISTANCE OF US WITHOUT ACCEPTING THE NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS OF THE TREATY, THE LESSON COULD BE CLEAR TO OTHERS.

5. EKLUND CITED RECENT REPORTS FROM JAPAN. THE IMPORTANT JAPANESE SUPPORTERS OF THE NPT (ABOVE ALL JAPANESE INDUSTRY) HAD UNTIL RECENTLY SUCCESSFULLY USED THE ARGUMENT THAT JAPAN MUST RATIFY IN ORDER TO CONTINUE TO HAVE UNINHIBITED ACCESS TO NUCLEAR FUEL, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY FROM THE US. THIS ARGUMENT WAS VITIATED BY THE EGYPT AND ISRAEL EXAMPLE. WITH REFERENCE TO OTHER NON-NPT PARTIES, EKLUND CITED SOUTH KOREA AS AN EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY MOVING RAPIDLY AHEAD IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD WITH PURCHASES FROM THE US, CANADA, AND POSSIBLY OTHERS WITHOUT ANY SERIOUS ATTEMPT BEING MADE TO ASSURE NPT RATIFICATION. WITH REFERENCE TO SPAIN, HE SAID HE HAD JUST TALKED TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR ARKADIEV, CHIDING THE SOVIETS FOR NOT REQUIRING SPANISH NPT RATIFICATION BEFORE PROVIDING URANIUM ENRICHMENTS SERVICES TO SPAIN. ARKADIEV'S

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CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 6175

RATHER LAME ANSWER WAS THAT THE USSR WAS OF COURSE REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS AND IN ANY CASE, IF THE US COULD CONTINUE TO SUPPLY ITALY WITH ENRICHED FUEL DESPITE ITALIAN FAILURE TO RATIFY THE TREATY, WHAT COULD THE SOVIETS DO IN THE CASE OF SPAIN?

6. EKLUND SAID MOST OF THE WORLD (INCLUDING THE SOVIETS) WERE WATCHING WHAT THE US REACTION TO THE NEW SITUATION WOULD BE. HE REALIZED THAT HIS SUGGESTIONS WERE SIMPLER TO CONFIDENTIAL

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MAKE THAN TO EXECUTE. THE US OF COURSE COULD NOT ACT ALONE AND WOULD HAVE TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF OTHER NUCLEAR EXPORTING STATES, BUT ONLY THE US COULD EXERCISE THE LEADERSHIP WHICH WAS NOW REQUIRED. HE THOUGHT THAT THE REAL DAMAGE TO THE NPT WOULD BE FIRST REVEALED IN MAY 1975 AT THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE. THERE WOULD BE SOME DEBATE AT THE PREPCOM MEETING IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR BUT IT WOULD BE RELATIVELY DESULTORY AND MOST STATES WOULD AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS AND HOLD THEIR FIRE TO SEE WHAT HAPPENED IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS. HE ADDED THAT HIS SOUNDINGS DID NOT

SUGGEST THAT THE US-USSR THRESHOLD TEXT BAN TREATY WOULD IMPROVE THE SITUATION APPRECIABLY. HE PERSONALLY ENDORSED IT AS A STEP FORWARD, BUT NOT ONE WHICH COULD PROVIDE ANY LEVERAGE IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION SENSE. IN FACT, IT WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE A COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IMPACT, IN NO WAY COUNTERING THE CRITICISM OF THE NPT ON "DISCRIMINATION" GROUNDS. PORTER

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